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2.1 Introduction
Around the world, pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) public pension programs
are facing serious long-term ﬁscal problems due primarily to actual and
projected population aging, and most appear unsustainable as currently
structured. All strict PAYGO programs (i.e., those that do not incorporate
sizable trust fund accumulations) can feasibly pay an implicit rate of re-
turn equal to the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP; labor force
growth plus productivity growth) once they are mature and in steady state.
This rate of return is typically lower than the rate of return that can be
earned in the market, either through low-risk bonds or through investment
in equities. The programs’ long-term ﬁscal problems relate to a misalign-
ment between these low but feasible rates of return and promised rates of
return that may once have been feasible but no longer are so. The tradi-
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here builds on basic research funded by NIA grant R37-AG11761.tional plans are mostly deﬁned beneﬁt and have been criticized for creat-
ing strong incentives for early retirement. More generally, there is a con-
cern that the taxes that ﬁnance these programs distort labor supply incen-
tives throughout life. Many also believe that these plans undermine
motivations to save, and, because they are themselves unfunded, thereby
reduce overall capital accumulation and consequently lead to lower labor
productivity and slower growth.
Recently, a new variety of public pension program known as “notional
deﬁned contribution” or “nonﬁnancial deﬁned contribution” (NDC) has
been created and implemented by Sweden, with ﬁrst payments in 2001. A
number of other countries have introduced or are planning to introduce
NDC plans, including Italy, Poland, Latvia, Mongolia, and the Kyrgyz Re-
public, and proposed new plans for France and Germany have NDC as-
pects (Legros 2003; Holtzmann and Palmer 2005).
The NDC programs diﬀer in detail, but the basic principle is that they
mimic deﬁned contribution plans without actually setting aside assets as
such plans do. Under an NDC program, a notional capital account is
maintained for each participant. Balances in this account earn a rate of re-
turn that is declared by the pension plan each year, and notional payments
into this account are made over the entire life history to mirror actual taxes
or contributions. Together with the declared rate of return, these notional
contributions determine the value of the account at any point in time. Af-
ter a designated age such as sixty-two, a participant can choose to begin to
draw beneﬁts, which is done by using the account to purchase an annuity
from the pension plan. The terms of the annuity will depend on mortality
at the time the generation turns sixty-ﬁve (for example) and on a rate of re-
turn stipulated by the pension plan, which might be the same rate of return
used in the preretirement accumulation phase.
The NDC plans are seen as having many potential advantages over tra-
ditional PAYGO systems, but our focus in this chapter is on just one of
these potential advantages, stability. A plan of this sort appears structured
to achieve a considerable degree of ﬁscal stability because the promised
rates of return reﬂect the program’s underlying PAYGO nature, rather than
being market-based, and the annuity structure should buﬀer the system
from the costs of rising longevity. Further, in the event that it begins to go
oﬀ the tracks, a braking mechanism can be incorporated that automati-
cally modiﬁes the rate of return to help restore the plan to ﬁnancial health.
Given the political diﬃculties of making frequent changes in PAYGO pen-
sion programs, the attractiveness of an inherently stable system is clear.
In this chapter, we use a stochastic macro model for forecasting and sim-
ulating Social Security ﬁnances to examine the behavior of NDC-type
public pension programs in the context of the U.S. demography and econ-
omy. Given the structure and strategy of the stochastic model, we can study
the probability distribution of outcomes (beneﬁt ﬂows and rates of return)
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as well as the overall ﬁnancial stability of the NDC system. The next sec-
tion of the chapter describes our stochastic forecasting model. In the fol-
lowing section, we describe in some detail the Swedish NDC program and
our adaptation of it to U.S. economic and demographic conditions. We
then provide simulations of this basic U.S. NDC plan, as well as variants
incorporating modiﬁcations of two key attributes of the NDC plan, the
method of determining rates of return, and the brake mechanism applied
when the system appears headed for ﬁnancial problems.
2.2 The Stochastic Forecasting/Simulation Model
The stochastic population model is based on a Lee-Carter (1992a,b)
mortality model and a somewhat similar fertility model (Lee 1993; Lee and
Tuljapurkar 1994). Lee and Carter model the time series of a mortality in-
dex as a random walk with drift, estimated over U.S. data from 1950 to
2003. This index then drives the evolution of age speciﬁc mortality rates
and thereby survival and life expectancy. This kind of model has been ex-
tensively tested (Lee and Miller 2001) and is widely accepted (Booth 2006),
and although we shall see that the probability intervals it produces for dis-
tant future life expectancy appear quite narrow, these intervals have per-
formed well in within-sample retrospective testing.
In a similar way, a fertility index drives age-speciﬁc fertility, but in this
case it is necessary to prespecify a long-term mean based on external in-
formation. We set the long-run mean of the total fertility rate equal to
the 1.95 births per woman, as assumed by the Social Security actuaries
(Trustees Report, 2004, henceforth TR04). The estimated model then sup-
plies the probability distribution for simulated outcomes. Because it is ﬁt-
ted on U.S. data, the fertility model reﬂects the possibility of substantial
baby boom and bust type swings.
Immigration is taken as given and deterministic, following the assumed
level in TR04.
Following Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994), these stochastic processes can be
used to generate stochastic population forecasts in which probability dis-
tributions can be derived for all quantities of interest. These stochastic
population forecasts can be used as the core of stochastic forecasts of the
ﬁnances of the Social Security system (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1998a,b; Lee,
Anderson, and Tuljapurkar 2003). Cross-sectional age proﬁles of payroll
tax payments and beneﬁt receipts are estimated from administrative data.
The tax proﬁle is then shifted over time by a productivity growth factor that
is itself modeled as a stochastic time series. The beneﬁt age proﬁle is shifted
over time in more complicated ways based on the level of productivity at
the time of retirement of each generation. The real rate of return on special
issue Treasury bonds is also modeled as a stochastic time series, and used
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values of the stochastic processes for productivity growth and rates of re-
turn are constrained to equal the central assumptions of TR04, but the ac-
tual stochastically generated outcomes will not exactly equal these central
assumptions, of course, even when averaged over a 100-year horizon.
The probability distributions for the stochastic forecasts are constructed
by using the frequency distributions for any variable of interest, or func-
tions of variables of interest, from a large number of stochastically gener-
ated sample paths, say 1,000, typically annually over a 100-year horizon.
Essentially, this is a Monte Carlo procedure. The stochastic sample paths
can equally well be viewed as stochastic simulations, and the set of sample
paths can be viewed as describing the stochastic context within which any
particular pension policy must operate.
The stochastic simulation model is not embedded in a macro model and,
therefore, does not incorporate economic feedbacks, for example, to sav-
ing rates and capital formation, and hence to wage rates and interest rates.
For some purposes, this would be an important limitation. However, the
model has given useful results for the uncertainty of Social Security ﬁ-
nances, and it should also give useful results in the present context. Once
the stochastic properties of diﬀerent policy regimes have been studied in
this manner, it may be appropriate to extend the analysis to incorporate
more general economic feedbacks in future work.
2.2.1 A Stochastic Laboratory: Simulating Statistical Equilibrium
To date, the stochastic Social Security method just described has been
used solely for projections or forecasts, based on the actual demography
and Social Security ﬁnances of the United States. However, it can also be
used as a stochastic laboratory to study how diﬀerent pension systems
would perform in a stochastic context divorced from the particularities of
the actual U.S. historical context with its baby boom, baby bust, and other
features. This is the main strategy we pursue in this chapter because we are
hoping to ﬁnd quite general properties of the NDC systems. We build on
the important earlier work by Alho, Lassila, and Valkonen (2005). This ap-
proach also enables us to avoid dealing initially with the problems of the
transition from our current system to the new system. Instead, we will an-
alyze the performance of a mature and established system in stochastic
steady state. In later work, we hope to consider the transition and to ac-
count for the actual historical initial conditions such as the current age dis-
tribution as shaped by the baby boom.
The key feature of a stochastic equilibrium is that the mean or expected
values of fertility, mortality, immigration, productivity growth, and inter-
est rates have no trend, and the population age distribution is stochasti-
cally stable rather than reﬂecting peculiarities of the initial conditions. The
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discussion, as follows.
1. Productivity growth and interest rates are already modeled as sta-
tionary stochastic processes with preset mean values, so these pose no par-
ticular problem.
2. Net immigration is set at a constant number per period, following the
Social Security assumptions (TR04). We treat immigration as determinis-
tic and constant.
3. Fertility is also modeled as a stationary stochastic process with a
long-term mean value of 1.95 births per woman, consistent with TR04.
This is below replacement level, so absent positive net immigration, the
simulated population would decline toward zero and go extinct, with the
only possible equilibrium population being zero. But with immigration,
there is some population size at which the natural decrease given a TFR of
1.95 will be exactly oﬀset by the net immigrant inﬂow, and this will be the
equilibrium population. The same principle applies in a stochastic context.
4. According to the ﬁtted Lee-Carter mortality model, the mortality
level evolves as a random walk with drift. First, we note that unless the drift
term is set to zero, mortality will have a trend. So in constructing our sto-
chastic equilibrium population, we will project mortality forward, with
drift, until 2100 and then set the drift to zero thereafter. This sets equilib-
rium life expectancy at birth to be about eighty-seven years. Second, we
note that a random walk, even with zero drift, is not a stationary process.
It has no tendency to return to an equilibrium level, but rather drifts
around. Our strategy is simply to set the drift term to zero. This means that
we cannot view the simulated process as truly achieving a statistical equi-
librium, but this is unlikely to cause any practical problems. An alternative
would be to alter the model to make it truly stationary by providing some
weak equilibrating tendency, for example, replacing the coeﬃcient of unity
on the previous level of mortality in the process by 0.99.
5. We also need to generate an appropriate initial state for our system.
We begin by constructing a deterministic stable population corresponding
to the mean values of fertility and mortality for the given inﬂow of immi-
grants. Population size adjusts until the net inﬂow of immigrants is equal
to the shortfall in births due to below-replacement fertility. We then start
our stochastic simulation from this initial population, but we throw out the
ﬁrst 100 years. We keep the next 500 years of stochastic simulations as our
experimental set. Figure 2.1 plots ﬁfteen stochastic sample paths for the
old age dependency ratio deﬁned as population 67  divided by the popu-
lation twenty-one to sixty-six. Evidently, the simulations often show very
pronounced long-term variations resulting from something like the baby
boom and baby bust in the United States.
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sample paths or stochastic trajectories. We will examine the performance
of diﬀerent policies within the context of this single set of stochastic tra-
jectories so that each must deal with the same set of random shocks, which
makes their performances more comparable.
2.3 NDC System Design
As is well-known, the feasible internal rate of return for a PAYGO sys-
tem with stable population structure equals the rate of growth of the pop-
ulation (which equals the rate of growth of the labor force, in steady state),
plus the rate of growth of output per worker. Alternatively, this implicit
rate of return simply equals the growth rate of GDP, provided that covered
wages are a constant share of GDP. The NDC systems aim to mimic the
structure of funded deﬁned contribution systems while maintaining ﬁscal
stability by using such an internally consistent rate of return (with due al-
lowance for the nonsteady state context) rather than a market-based rate
of return.
As under any pension system, an individual goes through two phases un-
der an NDC scheme, corresponding roughly to periods of work and re-
tirement. During the work phase, the individual’s payroll taxes (T) are
credited to a virtual account typically referred to as the individual’s “no-
tional pension wealth” (NPW). Like the individual account under an ac-
tual deﬁned contribution plan, this account has a stated value that grows
annually with contributions and the rate of return on prior balances; for an
individual, this evolution is represented by:
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Fig. 2.1 Ratio of retirees to workers, 15 sample paths(1) NPW t 1   NPW t(1   ri
t)   Tt,
where ri
t is the rate of return credited to each individual’s existing balances.
Unlike the individual account balance under the deﬁned contribution
plan, NPW is only a virtual balance, and the rate of return is based on the
system’s internal growth rate. Once an individual retires, he or she receives
an annuity based on the value of notional pension wealth at the time of re-
tirement.
The Swedish system normally bases ri on the contemporaneous rate of
growth of the wages per worker, which we call g, rather than the total
growth of wages, which would also account for the growth rate of the work-
force, which we label n.1 The notional accounts of individuals in Sweden
also receive an annual adjustment for so-called inheritance gains, repre-
senting a redistribution of the account balances of deceased cohort mem-
bers. That is, the rate of return to the cohort as a whole, which we denote r,
equals g, where r   g   ri.2
Upon retirement in the Swedish system, the individual’s NPW is con-
verted into an annuity stream based on contemporaneous mortality prob-
abilities and an assumed real rate of return of 1.6 percent. Letting the su-
perscript t denote the generation that reaches retirement age in year t, the
annuity in year t for an individual retiring that year, xt
t, may be solved for





(1.016) (s t 1)Pt
t,sxt




(1.016) (s t 1)Pt
t,s,
where NPWt
t is the individual’s notional pension wealth in the year of con-
version, Pt
t,sis the probability of survival from year tuntil year s, assessed in
year t, and Tis the maximum life span. In subsequent years, the individual’s
annuity level is increased or decreased according to whether the actual av-
erage growth of wages per worker, denoted rt   gt in the preceding, exceeds
or falls short of 1.6 percent. If wage growth continues at 1.6 percent, then
the annuity level would remain constant in real terms throughout the indi-
vidual’s life. However, if the realized growth of wages per worker in year t
were actually 1.3 percent, the annuity would be 0.3 percent lower in real
terms in year t   1 than in year t. If r were 1.3 percent in every year, the an-
nuity would fall in real terms at a rate of 0.3 percent per year.
2.3.1 The Brake Mechanism
The system just described incorporates an adjustment mechanism aimed
at keeping beneﬁts in a range that can be supported by growth in the pay-
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1. Our characterization of the Swedish system relies on several sources, including Palmer
(2000) and Settergren (2001a,b).
2. Accounts in Sweden are also reduced annually to account for administrative costs. In our
simulations, we ignore these adjustments and the underlying costs.roll tax base. However, the adjustment is not perfect. First, although ben-
eﬁts are adjusted annually for changes wage growth, they are not adjusted
after retirement to reﬂect changes in mortality projections. More impor-
tant, the cohort rate of return r in the Swedish system is based on the
growth rate of the average wage, g. While this approach might be more
comprehensible from an individual worker’s perspective, basing the co-
hort’s rate of return instead on the growth rate of the covered payroll, n  
g, would automatically take into account another determinant of the sys-
tem’s capacity to provide beneﬁts, the growth rate of the workforce. Fi-
nally, as illustrated in the appendix using a simpliﬁed version of the NDC
plan, even an NDC plan without these problems is not assured of annual
balance if n   g varies over time. This is in line with the analysis of Valdes-
Prieto (2000), who observed that, under certain conditions, an NDC plan
might be stable in a steady state, but will not be so in the short run.
Although it was anticipated by its designers that the Swedish system
would nevertheless be quite stable, they added to the system a balance
mechanism,3 which we call a “brake,” that would slow the growth rate of
notional pension wealth and reduce the level of pension beneﬁts in the
event of a threat to the system’s ﬁnancial stability, as measured by a “bal-
ance ratio” b based on the system’s conditions,
(3) b   .
The numerator of the balance ratio is meant to account for the system’s
assets and is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term in the numerator (F )
equals the ﬁnancial assets of the system (negative if the system has ﬁnan-
cial debt); the second term in the numerator (C) is a so-called contribution
asset equal to the product of a three-year moving median of tax revenues
and a three-year moving average of “turnover duration,” which is the aver-
age expected length of time between the payment of contributions and the
payment of beneﬁts, based on current patterns. If the economy were in a
steady state, the contribution asset would provide a measure of the size of
the pension liability that contributions could sustain.
The denominator is the pension system’s liability, equal to the sum of
two components. The ﬁrst component of the denominator (NPW) is ag-
gregate notional pension wealth for generations not yet retired; the second
component (P) is an approximation of commitments to current retirees,
equal to the sum over retired cohorts of current annual payments to each
cohort multiplied by that cohort’s so-called economic annuity divisor,
roughly the present value of their annuities calculated using the assumed
1.6 percent real return.4
F   C
  
NPW   P
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3. The balance mechanism is described in Swedish Pension System (2005, 38–39).
4. For further detail, see Swedish Pension System (2005, 70).This balance measure can be calculated entirely from observed values
and does not involve any projected values. This has the advantage of re-
ducing the risk of political manipulation, but a disadvantage in not taking
advantage of all information available at the time in computing the contri-
bution asset and the liability to current retirees, basing them simply on cur-
rent conditions.
The balance ratio is not a perfect measure of the system’s ﬁnancial
health. For example, the two components of the asset measure are based
on inconsistent rate-of-return assumptions, the ﬁnancial component being
assumed to yield a market rate of return and the contribution asset being
valued using the system’s implicit rate of return. However, one would still
expect a higher value of the balance ratio, in general, to be associated with
a more viable system.
We refer to the Swedish balance mechanism as a “brake” because its
eﬀect is to prevent the excessive accumulation of debt, but not of assets; it
applies only when the system is underfunded, as indicated by the balance
ratio, but not when it is overfunded. It was understood when the system
was designed that this potentially could lead to the accumulation of sur-
pluses, but no formal mechanism was put in place to deal with this. One
could imagine a system with a more symmetric brake that raises beneﬁts
and pension accumulations when the system is overfunded, and we con-
sider such a system in the following.
For the Swedish system, the balance mechanism is activated only when
the balance ratio bfalls below 1.0 and stays in eﬀect until a test of ﬁscal bal-
ance is satisﬁed. While the mechanism is active, two things happen each
year. First, cohort pension wealth accumulates not at a gross rate equal to
(1   gt), but instead at a rate equal to (1   gt)bt, where bt is the balance ra-
tio. Second, the gross rate of growth used to adjust the pension beneﬁts of
retirees is also set equal to (1   gt)bt, meaning a greater likelihood of a real
decline in pension beneﬁts for any given cohort because real beneﬁts grow
at a gross rate of (1  gt)bt/1.016. The balance mechanism remains in eﬀect
as long as the product of balance ratios from each year of the episode re-
mains below 1.0. That is, if the balance ratio ﬁrst falls below 1.0 in year t,
then the balance mechanism continues to apply in year s tif  s
v tbv 1.0.
Once this product exceeds 1.0, the balance mechanism is taken oﬀ, with a
new episode beginning the next time the balance ratio again falls below 1.0.
This design has several implications. First, because the balance mecha-
nism is removed when the product of balance ratios ﬁrst moves above 1.0,
the balance ratio must exceed 1.0 in the year the balance ratio is removed.
Second, as the balance ratio may stay below 1.0 for some time, there may
be several years during the episode for which b   1.0. Third, as mentioned
in the preceding, the balance mechanism is asymmetric, in that it applies
only when bﬁrst falls below 1.0; paths on which bstarts above 1.0 and rises
well above this level are subject to no external adjustment. Fourth, there
Notional Deﬁned Contribution Pension Systems in a Stochastic Context 51may be recurrent episodes during which the balance mechanism is in eﬀect.
Fifth, while the balance ratio as deﬁned in equation (3) can be negative (if
ﬁnancial debt exceeds the contribution asset), the balance mechanism is
not meaningful for b   0, for this would call for more than complete con-
ﬁscation of pension wealth and beneﬁts.
As to the logic of the test imposed to determine when the balance mech-
anism is removed, based on the product of balance ratios, this approach en-
sures that the balance mechanism has no long-run impact on the level of
beneﬁts. That is, the cumulative gross rate of return from the ﬁrst year in
which the brake applies, say t, through the year, say T, in which the prod-
uct of the balance ratios reaches 1.0 and, hence, the brake mechanism is re-
moved, is (1   gt)bt   (1   gt 1)bt 1   ...     (1   gT)   bT   (1   gt)   ...     (1  
gT)  (bt  ...    bT)  (1  gt)  ...    (1  gT). Even though there is no impact
on the long-run level of beneﬁts, the brake mechanism has the capacity to
reduce debt accumulation by keeping beneﬁts below their regular long-run
path for some time.
2.3.2 Adapting the NDC System to the U.S. Context
We have already outlined the basic structure of the Swedish NDC sys-
tem, but there are various details to be speciﬁed in adapting the system to
the U.S. context.
Contributions
What proportion of payroll is to be contributed? For comparability to
our current Social Security system, we assume the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI) tax rate of 10.6 percent, applied to the fraction of total
wages below the payroll tax earnings cap.
Rates of Return
Rate of return assumptions are required in two places in the NDC sys-
tem, for use in accretions of notional pension wealth and in conversion of
notional pension wealth into an annuity stream upon retirement. The
Swedish plan sets the ﬁrst of these rates equal to the growth rate of average
wages, which should roughly equal the growth rate of productivity. It sets
the second rate equal to 1.6 percent, taken to be the expected rate of pro-
ductivity growth, and then adjusts annuities up or down in response to
variations in the actual growth of the average wage. Sweden does not ac-
count for the growth rate of the labor force, but in principle it should be in-
cluded because it is a component of the rate of return to a PAYGO system.
Note that even if the growth rate of the labor force is not included, demog-
raphy will still inﬂuence the outcomes for generations through the back
door because if the system begins to go out of ﬁscal balance, then the brake
will be applied.
For the U.S. system, we take the long-run mean rate of growth of the real
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(TR04), as described in the following. We will refer to this interchangeably
as the productivity growth rate or the growth rate of wages, g, although
these are actually somewhat diﬀerent concepts.5 We have implemented
NDC in two ways for the United States, once with rate of return based only
on wage growth (g), and once with the rate of return based on both wage
growth and labor force growth (n   g). These will presumably distribute
risk in diﬀerent ways across the generations. In stochastic equilibrium,
population growth is near zero in any case, on average, but demographic
change will certainly occur along simulated sample paths.
Annuity Calculations
We assume that annuitization of NPW occurs at age sixty-seven, the nor-
mal retirement age to which the U.S. system is currently in transition. We
use the same rate of return for accumulations of NPW as in converting the
account balance at retirement into an annuity stream. That is, we use either
the growth rate of wages (g) or the growth rate of wages plus labor force
(n g) in both cases. As in the Swedish system, we set the pattern of the an-
nuity stream to be constant in real terms, based on the growth rate and
mortality projections at the time of the original annuity computation. Un-
like the Swedish system, we use the actual growth rate (either g or n   g) as
of retirement, rather than an assumed long-run value (in the Swedish case,
1.6 percent).
The annuity calculation can either be set once at the time of retirement,
or it might be updated during the beneﬁt period to reﬂect changes in the
implicit rate of return, as is done in Sweden. We have programmed both
possibilities, referring to one as “updating” and the other as “no updating.”
What mortality schedule is used to compute the annuitized income stream?
Once again, this can be based on conditions at the time a generation retires
(as is done in Sweden), or it can be revised during the beneﬁt period, an
approach that Valdes-Prieto (2000) refers to as a CREF-style annuity. We
have done it both ways, bundled into the “updating” and “no updating”
programs. Because we wish to determine the extent to which the NDC plan
can be made stable, we present the results for the updating version in the
following. However, the diﬀerence between the two versions is minor in our
simulations, so the lack of updating for mortality experience in the actual
Swedish system is unlikely to be a signiﬁcant source of instability.
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5. We note that the growth rate of productivity (output per hour of labor) may overstate the
growth rate of covered wages, as is explicitly taken into account by the U.S. Social Security
Administration. The growth rate of covered wages will be aﬀected by changes in the supply of
labor per member of the population of working age and by sex, both labor force participation
and hours worked per participant, and by shifts in the population age distribution. It will also
be aﬀected by the proportion of compensation that is given in pretax fringe beneﬁts.The Brake
As explained earlier, the Swedish program has a brake but a limited “ac-
celerator” that applies only until the impact of the brake on the level of
beneﬁts has been reversed. If surpluses begin to accumulate, there is no
mechanism to raise beneﬁts or reduce taxes relative to what is called for by
the basic system. In our NDC program, we have incorporated this brake,
but we also consider how much better it does than a simpler asymmetric
brake that applies only when b   1 (i.e., a brake mechanism without the
Swedish system’s provision for bringing beneﬁts back to their long-run lev-
els). In another version, we use a symmetric brake with an accelerator that
raises the rate of return and raises current beneﬁts when the ﬁscal ratio ex-
ceeds unity.
A second change we implement is in the design of the brake mechanism
itself. As discussed in the preceding, the brake in the Swedish system mul-
tiplies the gross return implied by wage growth, rt, by the current balance
ratio of system assets to system liabilities. That is, when the brake is in
eﬀect, the adjusted net rate of return, rt
a, is given by
(4) rt
a   (1   rt)bt   1.
At low values of b, this mechanism implies a near conﬁscation of pension
wealth, a not very desirable outcome if one is trying to spread ﬁscal bur-
dens among generations. We, therefore, consider a generalized version of
the balance mechanism in which equation (4) is replaced by:
(5) rt
a   (1   rt)[1   A(bt   1)]   1,
where r and b are deﬁned as before and A   [0,1] is a scaling factor. Setting
A   1 results in a brake like that in equation (4); when A   1, full conﬁs-
cation will result only when b reaches 1 – 1/A   0. Setting A   0 eliminates
the brake mechanism, and a positive value of A that is too small will still
fail to provide adequate ﬁnancial stability.
In the following simulations, we use a value of A 0.5, meaning that the
mechanism is well-deﬁned for values of b above –1. This value of A was
large enough to ensure that virtually none of the 1,000 trajectories, each
500-years long, ever encountered the lower bound on b for NDC type sys-
tems with r   g(only 2 of 1,000 trajectories for the asymmetric brake case
and 7 of 1000 for the symmetric brake case). Even for a much lower value
of A   .2, the lower bound is basically irrelevant for trajectories with r   n
  g and binds along only relatively few trajectories for NDC systems with
r   g (15 for the asymmetric brake and 47 for the symmetric brake).
Initial Conditions
As discussed in the preceding, we start our simulations with a popula-
tion structure based on a deterministic version of our demographic model,
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istic distribution of demographic characteristics for the stochastic version
of the model, which we then simulate over a period of 500 years.
We also use this initial 100-year period to establish the initial conditions
for the NDC system. As of the beginning of the actual simulation period,
and for each trajectory, we calculate each working cohort’s NPW based on
its earnings during the presample period and the relevant growth rates (gor
n g) used in compounding NPW accumulations. For each retired cohort,
we calculate annuity values in the same manner. Finally, we assume an ini-
tial stock of ﬁnancial assets equal to ﬁfty times the average primary deﬁcit
in the ﬁrst year of the model based on g with no brake. (This is roughly the
level that would be needed to service the primary deﬁcit while maintaining
a constant assets-payroll ratio.)
Deﬁning the Policy Scenarios
We simulate eight versions of the NDC system, diﬀering as to whether
the rate of return is based on the productivity growth rate, g; or the growth
rate of wages, n   g; the type of brake used in attempting to achieve ﬁscal
stability (none, Swedish, asymmetric, symmetric); and the strength of the
factor, A, used to modify the brake adjustment.
In our projections, the mean rate of growth of the real covered wage is
assumed to be 1.1 percent per year, following the assumptions of the Social
Security trustees. The long-run growth rate of the projected population is
close to zero in the stochastic equilibrium we generate, so the growth rate
of covered wages is also about 1.1 percent per year. The internal rates of re-
turn for individual cohorts along any given trajectory of our stochastic
projections should, therefore, tend to ﬂuctuate around this central value if
the system maintains ﬁnancial stability.6 In addition to considering the in-
ternal rates of return (IRR) under each NDC variant, we are also inter-
ested in the ﬁnancial stability that each system provides. We measure ﬁ-
nancial or ﬁscal balance using the ratio of ﬁnancial assets to payroll, where
in the following ﬁgures a negative value indicates debt. Note that the nu-
merator of this expression includes only ﬁnancial assets, not the “contri-
bution asset” that is used in computing the balance ratio.
2.4 Simulation Results
Consider ﬁrst the performance of the NDC system based on r   g,
roughly the Swedish approach without a brake mechanism. As shown in
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6. The Social Security trustees’ assumption about GDP growth is 1.5 percent (this is from
TR04, where it results from 1.6 percent productivity growth, plus 0.2 percent growth in total
employment plus the GDP deﬂator of 2.5 percent, minus the Consumer Price Index (CPI) de-
ﬂator of 2.8 percent). But this is not in stochastic equilibrium, the population growth rate is
not near zero, and the ratio of covered payroll to GDP is changing over time.the ﬁrst row oftable 2.1, this system provides a mean internal rate of return
of 1.07 percent, close to the rate of 1.1 percent for a system in which all
variables are constant at their mean values. Note that the IRR is a highly
nonlinear function of the variables so that the mean IRR across stochastic
trajectories need not be close to the IRR of the means of the trajectories.
The median IRR also equals 1.07 percent for this scheme. However, the
need for a brake is quite evident from ﬁgures 2.2and 2.3, the latter of which
will be discussed in more detail below. These ﬁgures show the distribution
of assets-payroll ratios for the system’s ﬁrst 100 years of operation. The me-
dian trajectory has essentially no accumulation of debt or assets. But, with
no brake, some trajectories lead to accumulation of debt levels nearly forty
times payroll, clearly an unsustainable level. Indeed, a debt-payroll ratio of
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Fig. 2.2 Financial assets/payroll (r   g, no brake)
Table 2.1 Average internal rates of return (IRR)
Simulation Mean IRR Median IRR
NDC (g) no brake .0107 .0107
NDC (g) Swedish brake .0100 .0109
NDC (g) asymmetric brake, A   1 .0093 .0105
NDC (g) symmetric brake, A   1 .0122 .0130
NDC (g) symmetric brake, A   .5 .0106 .0130
NDC (n   g) no brake .0110 .0113
NDC (n   g) Swedish brake .0110 .0113
NDC (n   g) symmetric brake, A   .5 .0133 .0134
Source: Calculated from stochastic simulations described in text.
Note: NDC   notional deﬁned contribution.nearly 10 is present after 100 years in one-sixth of all trajectories, so this
problem is not one limited to extreme draws from the distribution of out-
comes. In addition, several trajectories involve substantial accumulation of
assets relative to payroll.
Now consider the NDC system with the Swedish brake in place. As one
would expect, imposing such a brake reduces the mean IRR, as shown in
the second row of table 2.1. The median IRR, though, actually rises
slightly.7 As ﬁgure 2.4 shows, the lower tail of assets-payroll outcomes is
raised, as also expected. Indeed, the Swedish balance mechanism is ex-
tremely successful in preventing excessive debt accumulation. After 100
years, the 2.5th percentile of the asset-payroll distribution is just –0.26, a
debt-payroll ratio of just over one-quarter. But, even with the periods of
acceleration that exist while it is in eﬀect, the balance mechanism does little
to restrain the accumulation of assets. Indeed, by cutting oﬀ the lower tail
of the asset-payroll distribution, the balance mechanism raises both me-
dian and mean assets-payroll ratios so that both are substantially positive
after 100 years. Indeed, even the 83.3rd percentile is slightly higher, as
heading oﬀ debt makes the subsequent accumulation of assets levels more
likely along a given trajectory.
This upward shift in the distribution of assets over time has an interest-
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Fig. 2.3 Financial assets/payroll (r   g, no brake, constant interest, growth rates)
7. This result is possible because the brake mechanism has periods during which the growth
rates of NPW accumulation and beneﬁts are accelerated relative to the basic system without
a brake. Thus, even though the brake mechanism is designed to reduce beneﬁts overall while
in eﬀect, it may have distributional eﬀects across cohorts that reduce the returns of cohorts
with IRR already below the median, while raising the returns of those at the median.ing impact on the distribution of IRR by cohort. Figure 2.5 shows this dis-
tribution for the Swedish brake just discussed, for all cohorts with com-
plete lifetimes during the 500-year simulation period. For early cohorts,
the lower tail of the distribution of IRR is quite low due to a chance of pro-
longed downward adjustment of NPW and beneﬁts in the case of low rates
of growth. Over time, the likelihood of such an outcome falls; with prior as-
set accumulation, even a series of bad draws with respect to the growth rate
are less likely to drive the balance ratio below 1.0.
The Swedish balance mechanism is asymmetric, taking eﬀect only once
the balance ratio falls below 1.0. Once in eﬀect, however, the Swedish
mechanism does provide for “catch-up” periods of faster growth. A sim-
pler mechanism would eliminate the catch-up phase and apply simply
whenever b 1. How diﬀerent would this even more asymmetric system be
from the Swedish system? That is, how signiﬁcant is the catch-up phase of
the Swedish balance mechanism? Figure 2.6 shows the asset accumulation
pattern under this simple asymmetric brake. As one would expect, the dis-
tribution is shifted upward relative to the Swedish system, but only slightly.
Consistent with this upward shift, the mean and median internal rates of
return are a bit lower for this plan than for the Swedish system (compare
the second and third lines of table 2.1). Thus, the Swedish system performs
very much like a purely asymmetric brake, doing very well at avoiding debt
accumulation but actually increasing the possibility of signiﬁcant asset ac-
cumulation.
To limit asset accumulation in the presence of a brake, a symmetric
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Fig. 2.4 Financial assets/payroll (r   g, Swedish brake)Fig. 2.5 Internal rates of return (r   g, Swedish brake)
Fig. 2.6 Financial assets/payroll (r   g, asymmetric brake, A   1)brake mechanism is needed to increase accumulations and annuity bene-
ﬁts when the system’s ﬁscal health is assured, not just to compensate for
past periods of cutbacks. A symmetric brake would always be in eﬀect, ad-
justing beneﬁts and NPW up or down according to expression (4) or (5) re-
gardless of whether bis below or above 1.0. Implementing a symmetric ver-
sion of the brake leads to more generous beneﬁts for some trajectories, and
hence higher mean and median IRR, as the fourth row of table 2.1 shows.
(It also eliminates the trend in internal rates of return seen in ﬁgure 2.5.)
The distribution of assets-payroll ratios is similar for the lower tail as un-
der the Swedish and asymmetric brakes, but the upper tail has been pulled
down by the brake’s symmetry, with the 97.5th percentile assets-payroll
ratio just below 1.2 after 100 years. Further, both the mean and median
assets-payroll ratios stay close to zero. Thus, the NDC system can be made
to be quite stable ﬁnancially, in both directions, by applying the brake not
only when the balance ratio is too low but also when it is too high. This sta-
bility holds over the longer term as well, as shown in ﬁgure 2.7, which ex-
hibits the distribution of assets-payroll ratios over 500 years for the sym-
metric brake scheme.
Another modiﬁcation of the brake mechanism is in its strength rather
than its symmetry. While rapid adjustment of beneﬁts and NPW growth
may provide stability, it may also concentrate the burdens of ﬁscal adjust-
ment on relatively few cohorts. We plan to explore the questions of risk-
sharing and distribution in subsequent research, but we can consider here
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Fig. 2.7 Financial assets/payroll (r   g, symmetric brake, A   1)the impact of a more gradual adjustment process on the stability of the
brake mechanism. Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of asset-payroll ratios
when the brake is symmetric but the adjustment parameter, A, is set equal
to 0.5 rather than 1. One can see from a comparison of ﬁgures 2.7 and 2.8
that more gradual adjustment does widen the distribution by about a third,
but the impact is limited.
Another potential modiﬁcation of the NDC system involves the compu-
tation of the rate of return for NPW accumulations and annuity computa-
tions. Even if the average population growth rate is zero, this growth rate
can ﬂuctuate, and with this ﬂuctuation the ability of the NDC system to
cover beneﬁts. Thus, building population growth into the rate of return
should provide greater system stability, ceteris paribus. Figures 2.9, 2.10,
2.11, and 2.12, and the last three rows of table 2.1, present assets-payroll
distributions and IRR for NDC systems based on r   n   g for the no-
brake, Swedish-brake, and symmetric-brake (A   0.5) variants.
The impact of this change in the method is most easily seen by compar-
ing ﬁgures 2.9 and 2.10, the trajectory of debt under the NDC system with
no brake and with r n g, and ﬁgures 2.2 and 2.3, the debt trajectory un-
der the system with no brake and r   g. While the assets-payroll distribu-
tion still does not fully stabilize, its range is much smaller, especially in the
lower tail. The (2.5, 97.5) range of outcomes is now (–2,  8) instead of
(–35,  19). Still, a brake is needed to prevent eventual debt explosion
along some paths, and the Swedish brake accomplishes this, as in the pre-
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Fig. 2.10 Financial assets/payroll (r   n   g, no brake, constant interest, growth
rates)
Fig. 2.9 Financial assets/payroll (r   n   g, no brake)
vious case of r g. Again, basing pension calculations on n grather than
g also substantially reduces the variation in asset-payroll ratios, as one can
see from a comparison of ﬁgures 2.4 and 2.11. Even though the upper
range of the distribution has been lowered, though, a symmetric brake is
still needed to stabilize the upside. Thus, even for the case of r   n   g, aNotional Deﬁned Contribution Pension Systems in a Stochastic Context 63
Fig. 2.12 Financial assets/payroll (r   n   g, symmetric brake, A   .5)
Fig. 2.11 Financial assets/payroll (r   n   g, Swedish brake)
symmetric brake is a sine qua non for system stability in the very long run.
Figure 2.12 shows the trajectory for the symmetric brake with r n gand
A   0.5. As under the plan with r   g pictured in ﬁgure 2.8, the distribu-
tion of outcomes is quite acceptable over even 500 years. A comparison of
the two ﬁgures indicates that using n   g in calculating the rate of return isparticularly eﬀective at preventing debt accumulation, a result that was
also evident in the earlier comparisons.
2.4.1 Sources of Instability
As we have seen, the basic NDC system, even with Swedish-style net
brake, is ﬁnancially unstable. Even the NDC system based on setting the
rate of return r   n   g requires the application of a symmetric brake to
head oﬀ substantial asset or debt accumulations on some trajectories.
What is causing such instability? One can consider the impact of some
sources of uncertainty by eliminating others from the simulations.
In our basic model, uncertainty arises from demographic and economic
changes, the latter consisting of ﬂuctuations in the interest rate and the rate
of productivity growth.8 These economic ﬂuctuations, it turns out, are an
important source of the NDC system’s instability. Figures 2.3 and 2.10
present 100-year distributions of debt-payroll ratios for both versions of
the NDC system (g and n   g) with no brake, corresponding to ﬁgures 2.2
and 2.9 and diﬀering from the systems depicted in those ﬁgures only in that
productivity growth and the interest rate are held constant at their mean
values. With only demographic ﬂuctuations present, these new ﬁgures
show the distributions of asset-payroll ratios are substantially narrowed.
Under the NDC(g) system, the (2.5, 97.5) percentile range at 100 years
shrinks from (–35,  19) to (–22,  8); under the NDC (n   g) system, the
same range shrinks from (–2,  8) to (–0.5,  2.5). Thus, even with the
growth rate g incorporated in the rate of return used in the NDC system’s
calculations, this process does not come close to neutralizing ﬂuctuations
in that growth rate. Although these comparisons may seem to indicate that
demographic ﬂuctuations are an unimportant source of uncertainty rela-
tive to productivity growth and interest rates, other comparisons show the
dramatic improvement in stability that results from including demographic
change, n, in the system rate of return. For example, comparing ﬁgure 2.10
to ﬁgure 2.3 indicates that instability as measured by the width of the 95
percent range is narrowed by a factor of 10 in the n   g system relative to
the g system, and comparison of ﬁgure 2.9 to ﬁgure 2.2 indicates that this
range narrows by a factor of 7 even when the economic variation is in-
cluded as well. Clearly, both the economic and demographic variation are
important sources of uncertainty in these NDC systems.
2.5 Conclusions
We have considered the ﬁnancial stability of diﬀerent variants of a sys-
tem of notional deﬁned contribution accounts, using demographic and
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8. The interest rate matters because the NDC approach is not a pure PAYGO system. With
nonzero values of ﬁnancial assets, the rate of return on these assets matters.economic characteristics of the United States. In subsequent work, we will
consider other aspects of NDC systems, notably their ability to smooth
economic and demographic risks among diﬀerent generations. Among our
ﬁndings are the following:
1. A system similar to that currently in use in Sweden, which bases rates
of return on the growth rate of average wages and utilizes a brake to adjust
the rate of return during periods of ﬁnancial stress, ensures eﬀectively
against excessive debt accumulation but, very much like a simpler asym-
metric brake, leads, on average, to considerable asset accumulation.
2. Only a symmetric brake, which raises rates of return during periods
of ﬁnancial strength, can avoid considerable accumulations of ﬁnancial as-
sets on some paths. The brake can be more gradual than under the Swedish
system and still provide a stable distribution of outcomes.
3. An NDC system in which rates of return are based on total rather
than per capita economic growth is inherently more stable than the basic
NDC system, without reference to the brake mechanism in use.
4. A considerable share of the volatility in the ﬁnancial performance of
NDC systems is attributable to economic, rather than demographic, un-
certainty.
Evidently, stochastic simulation of the system’s ﬁnances can reveal aspects
of its performance that are not otherwise obvious and can assist in im-
proving system design. This promises to be a valuable use for stochastic
simulation models of pension systems.
Appendix
Beneﬁts and Taxes under a Simple NDC Plan
This appendix illustrates the relationship between beneﬁts and taxes at a
given point in time under a simple version of the notional deﬁned contri-
bution scheme in which the intrinsic rate of return is based on the growth
rate of covered wages.
Consider the relationship between taxes and beneﬁts at any given date t
under a simpliﬁed version of an NDC system under which the rate of re-
turn used to accumulate notional pension wealth and to calculate annu-
ities, rt, is equal to the contemporaneous growth of covered wages.
Taxes at time t are:
(A1) T t   (Wt
t 1   Wt
t 2   ...     Wt
t L),
where Wt
t j is covered wages in year t for the entire cohort that will retire j
years hence, and L is the number of years that individuals work.
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annual real return on its notional pension wealth of rt so that the cohort’s
NPW will stay constant in real terms after retirement, and its annual pay-
out is constant as well.9 Then aggregate beneﬁts at date t will equal:
(A2) Bt   rt(NPWt
t   NPWt 1
t 1   . . .),
where NPWt–j
t–j is the notional pension wealth in the year of retirement for
cohort retiring in year t – j. The notional pension wealth at retirement for
cohort t – j is:
(A3) NPWt j
t j   [Wt j
t j 1   Wt j
t j 2(1   rt j 1)   ...  
  Wt j
t j L 
L 1
l 1
(1   rt j l)].
Combining expressions (A2) and (A3) and comparing the resulting ex-
pression with expression (A1), we can see that a suﬃcient condition for
taxes and beneﬁts to be equal is that, for all k between 1 and L,
(A4)  Wt




t j k 
k 1
l 1
(1   rt j l),
or that taxes paid by workers k years away from retirement equal beneﬁts
attributable to earnings at the same age for all retirees.
We have assumed that rsequals the growth rate of covered wages between
dates s – 1 and s. If we assume in addition that this growth rate is shared by
the entire age-wage distribution (i.e., that the relative age-distribution of
covered wages remains ﬁxed), then expression (A4) can be rewritten as:
(A5) Wt
t k   rtWt
t k∑
 
j 0  
j
m 1
(1   rt m) 1 
k 1
l 1





(1   rt k p) 1∑
 
j 0  
j
m 1
(1   rt m) 1 
k 1
l 1




(1   rt 1 q) 1∑
 
j 0  
j
m 1
(1   rt m) 1 
k 1
l 1
(1   rt j l)   1.
The last line of expression (A5) is satisﬁed if r is constant over time, which
reﬂects the underlying consistency of using the growth of covered wages as
a rate of return for the NDC system. If r varies over time, though, expres-
sion (A5) will generally not hold. For example, suppose k   1, correspon-
ding to wages in the year prior to retirement. Then the last line of (A5) re-
duces to:
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9. This assumption implies that a cohort’s beneﬁts per capita grow as the cohort’s popula-
tion declines and indeed approaches inﬁnity as the generation dies oﬀ, which is obviously un-
realistic. We impose it here only for purposes of exposition.(A6) rt(1   rt 1) 1[1   (1   rt 1) 1   (1   rt 2) 1   . . .]   1.
From this, we can see that if the current growth rate used to compute an-
nuities, rt, is greater (less) than the growth rates of covered wages during the
accumulation phase, then the expression on the left side will be greater
(less) than 1 and taxes on earnings for those in the year prior to retirement
will be inadequate (more than adequate) to cover beneﬁts for retirees based
on earnings in the year prior to retirement. Although the results are more
complicated for values of k   1, the point is that variations in r over time
can cause the NDC system to run deﬁcits or surpluses, the variation being
larger the larger is the variation in the growth rate of covered wages. This
variation in deﬁcits occurs even under the assumption of a ﬁxed covered
earnings age proﬁle; relaxing this assumption adds yet another potential
source of variation in the system’s annual deﬁcits.
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Comment Jeﬀrey Liebman
Notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) systems are the latest fad in social
security retirement system design, having been adopted in the past decade
in Sweden, Italy, Poland, Latvia, and Mongolia. Additional countries are
looking seriously at the NDC model. For example, there is currently a de-
bate raging in China about the future of its social security system.
The Chinese pension law on the books says that China is implementing
a funded deﬁned contribution (DC) personal retirement account (PRA)
system. Unfortunately, local governments responsible for collecting the
revenues for the personal accounts have been diverting the funds to other
uses—resulting in what is known as the “empty accounts” problem. Some
western experts have been arguing that China should follow through with
the setting up of funded accounts—that the establishment of clear prop-
erty rights to the accounts will minimize the chance that local governments
continue to misappropriate the funds (Feldstein and Liebman 2006). Other
experts have argued that China should adopt an NDC system (Ahser et al.
2005)—an approach that would result in the accounts remaining perma-
nently empty.
The fundamental features of an NDC system are that it is pay-as-you-go
and that there is a transparent relationship between contributions and fu-
ture beneﬁts, with beneﬁts deﬁned by the accumulation of past payroll tax
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